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Abstract. We present a framework to formally describe probabilistic system be-
havior and symbolically reason about it. In particular we aim at reasoning about
possible failures and fault tolerance. We regard systems which are composed of
different units: sensors, computational parts and actuators. Considering worst-
case failure behavior of system components, our framework is most suited to
derive reliability guarantees for composed systems. The behavior of system com-
ponents is modeled using monad like constructs that serve as an abstract repre-
sentation for system behavior. We introduce rules to reason about these represen-
tations and derive results like guaranteed upper bounds for system failure. Our
approach is characterized by the fact that we do not just map a certain component
to a failure probability, but regard distributions of error behavior and their evolve-
ment over system runs. This serves as basis for deriving probabilities of events, in
particular failure probabilities. The work presented in this paper slightly extends
a complete framework and a case study which has been previously published [4].
One focus of this report is a more detailed explanation of definitions and a more
comprehensive description of examples.
1 Introduction
The need for analysis of probabilistic systems arises in many domains connected to
safety critical embedded systems. Especially the analysis of fault-tolerance establishes
the need to model probabilistic distributions of failures and reason about them. Guar-
anteeing worst-case failure probabilities is an important prerequisite for certification of
safety critical systems.
In this paper we present a framework to model probabilistic behavior of systems
– especially systems’ failure behavior. Our framework represents distinct parts of sys-
tem behavior in an abstract monadic [21] way. We allow the modeling of behavioral
entities with probabilistic distributions representing possible failures or uncertainties.
When composing a system from different components, our approach allows modeling
the propagation of failures through components by monadic composition of behavior
associated with the components.
The second ingredient of our framework comprises rules to reason about systems.
Our rules allow determining the semantic equivalence of systems and the reduction of
systems to other systems such that certain properties are guaranteed to be preserved.
The reduction of systems into simpler systems may be used to analyze and optimize
systems.
Our approach comprises the following characteristics that all together distinguish it
from existing approaches:
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– Modeling of system behavior and possible faults using monad like constructs.
– Representation of uncertain/faulty behavior as distributions of possible behavior.
– Rules to reason about system behavior and distributions of values that appear in
this system.
The work presented in this paper extends a complete framework and a case study
which has been previously published [4]. An extended formalization and a more de-
tailed discussion of previous formalization aspects are new to this paper. The main
intended purpose of the work presented here is the usage in safety critical industrial
automation systems.
1.1 Related Work
One long-term goal of our work is the formalization of the framework and its proper-
ties described here using a higher-order proof assistant. Early work establishing fault
tolerance guarantees using theorem proving techniques is presented in [14]. Based on a
formalism using extended petri nets, properties of (digital) hardware systems are shown.
Furthermore, [18] describes work on guaranteeing fault-tolerance related properties us-
ing the PVS theorem prover. Here, systems and constraints are ported and proved in
PVS. The presented examples come from the microprocessor and avionics domains.
Abstractions for reasoning about fault-tolerant systems in a higher-order theorem
prover are presented and discussed in [22]. The abstraction aims at facilitating and stan-
dardizing the use of formal methods, especially higher-order theorem provers. Abstrac-
tions for individual message passing, faults, fault-masking, and further communication
aspects are regarded.
Other early work comprises [3] which presents a Specification and Design Lan-
guage (SDL) based framework. Other related work for guaranteeing fault tolerant prop-
erties using formal methods comprise the use of model-checking techniques [19] and
concentrate on formal specification techniques [13]. The analysis of probabilistic sys-
tem behavior is the goal of probabilistic model-checkers, like PRISM [15].
Modeling and reasoning aspects about probabilistic programs have been extensively
studied in [16]. Here a language is introduced to describe probabilistic programs and
reasoning about programs has a strong connection to this language. Further work on
formal analysis of probabilistic systems has been done in the event-B context [10].
Like the work focused on theorem proving techniques, but unlike the (probabilistic)
model checking approaches, we have a strong focus on symbolic reasoning. Unlike the
existing theorem prover based work we have a strong focus on symbolically represent-
ing distributions of values and combining them. Handling errors and varying values as
distributions as we do in this work allows a much richer failure analysis than assigning
failure probabilities to distinct system components. For example, it allows the specifi-
cation and handling of ranges in which a deviation from an optimal value is acceptable.
The framework presented in this paper builds upon work for a monadic representa-
tion of probabilities in programs [2] and an application for the analysis of cryptographic
protocols [6]. Like in the analysis of cryptographic protocols, we regard possible com-
putations that are associated with certain distributions of values. Furthermore, we regard
rules that allow reasoning about sequences of such computations. In [6] and in this work
the use of a monadic representation was chosen because:
– It gives a syntactic representation of the semantics of non-deterministic systems.
This non-determinism can be “quantified” in the sense that different possibilities in
the system execution can be assigned to different probabilities. This is achieved in
combination with the use of distributions. Finally, it enables us to even specify an
infinite amount of possibilities and reason about probabilities by using continuous
probability distributions.
– The syntactic representation is well suited to match rules against and reason about
it in a symbolic way.
– As used in [6] and as a possible future extension this gives us the possibility to
reason about our system in an automatic or interactive way using, e.g., a higher-
order theorem prover.
Related ideas for proving properties of (system-)processes are investigated in the
context of process algebras [12,17]. The description of system behavior as a process is
also featured in our framework. Nevertheless, we do not regard the presented specifi-
cation and reasoning framework as a process algebra. Unlike in process algebras, our
focus is not only on replacing terms by semantical equivalent ones, but rather on en-
suring that a certain property is preserved during a transformation or is even improved.
Like the Spi calculus [1] we target a distinct problem domain.
A future goal of our work is giving rise to certifying properties of systems in a
scenario similar to [8].
As an amendment to our work on guaranteeing distinct probabilities, patterns for
achieving fault tolerance have been extensively studied (e.g., [11]).
1.2 Overview
We present prerequisites like our monad and basic facts about probabilities in Section 2.
The modeling framework is presented in Section 3. Section 4 features the rules to reason
about system descriptions modeled in our framework. In Section 5 we present a larger
example from the industrial control domain. In Section 6 we present a second example
using discrete distributions. Finally, Section 7 gives a conclusion.
2 Prerequisites
In this section we describe a monad like construct to formalize computations [2,6,4].
This is needed to represent system behavior in a compositional way. The idea is to divide
system behavior into different computation steps which correspond to distinct system
components or computation parts. These steps realize state transitions. Traditionally,
a state comprises a kind of memory, e.g., variables which are associated with values.
Unlike this, in our work, we consider states in which a variable is associated with a
probabilistic distribution of possible values rather than a single value. Furthermore, we
present some probabilistic background knowledge.
Distributions Distributions may be either discrete or continuous. For a finite type T the
(discrete) uniformly random distribution is denoted $T . For a given value val associated
with a type T the distribution that contains just this value (probability 100 percent) is
denoted UT (val). We omit the T if the type is obvious from the context.
In the case of discrete distributions, the distribution can be regarded as a function
that maps an element to its probability. For a given discrete distribution, the probability
of an element x from D is denoted D(x).
For the non-discrete case, fD denotes the density function of the distributionD. PD
denotes the cumulative distribution function. Assuming a total order on the elements of
D, the probability of all elements inD that are less or equal than x is denoted PD(x), In
the case of normal distributions we use N (µ, σ2) for a normal distribution with mean
µ and variance σ2.
In mathematical distributions, the probability of all elements will sum up to 1 or in
case of continuous distributions, the integral over the density function will deliver 1.
In our framework, we use a slightly more general notion of distributions: in order to
handle numerical approximations of distributions we allow deviations from 1.
Monads and their composition In our formalization, behavior is formalized using ab-
stract computations. These are based on the abstract computation monad (cf. [2,6]) used
for representing the changes of variable distributions. Here, we use a slightly adapted
definition:
Definition 1 (Abstract Computation). For a set of variables V an abstract computa-
tion MV is defined by two functors unit and bind.
unit : (V → CV )→MV bind : MV → V → U →MV
unit comprises a set of initial variables distributions: (V → CV ) is a mapping from
variable names of type V to their distributions of type CV . bind comprises an abstract
computation, an update set of variables of type V : V and a set of updates U . The update
set contains all variables that have to be updated. An update is a tuple:
(V × ((V → ValV )→ DV ))
It comprises a variable to be updated of type V and a function that takes a mapping
from variables of type V to values of type ValV and returns a distribution of type DV .
The unit constructor formalizes initial variable distributions. A bind is a single distinct
computation step: The variable to distributions mapping resulting from evaluating the
abstract computation (first argument of bind) is taken and for all variables in the update
set (second argument of bind) the appropriate update function (in the third argument of
bind) is performed resulting in new distributions for these variables.
While abstract computations are syntactical structures their semantics is given by a
function [...] returning a mapping from variables to their distributions.
Example The semantics of the term
[bind (bind (unit {(v 7→ $Tv )}) {v} {(v, v 7→ UTv (f(v)))} ) {v} {(v, v 7→ UTv (g(v)))} ]
is that a value is drawn from a uniformly distributed distribution $Tv . A function is
applied to this value, thus obtaining f(v). and a distribution is made of this inner bind
statement. In the next step a value is drawn from this distribution (associated with vari-
able v) and a function g is applied to it. The entire term again denotes a distribution.
v 7→ D is used to denote a function that maps a variable v to a distribution D.
If f and g are permutations the resulting distribution will be again uniformly dis-
tributed. In the remainder of this paper the “,” is used to denote monadic composition
of terms composed of bind and unit. Furthermore, we may omit the [...] when using the
“,” notation.
As a second example, we present an equation: a value is drawn from a distribution
and one builds a new distribution that contains just this value. This denotes the original
distribution:
[(v,D), (v,UTv (v))] = [(v,D)]
In the following, we allow abusing the = for denoting semantically equivalent terms,
i.e., we allow omitting the [...] and may thus write:
(v,D), (v,UTv (v)) = (v,D)
Abstract Computations in Updates Updates can contain abstract nested computations
which are interpreted using [...]. These abstract computations may work on a different
variable domain. Furthermore, only the variable of the update is effected outside such a
nested abstract computations. This formalism may be used to realize abstract scopes of
variables. We omit the [...] when using the “,” notation.
The following shows an example:
(v, ((v,Dv), (v
′, Dv′)))
The variable v is updated in a nested abstract computation with the distributionDv . The
update to v′ is not exported out of this scope and v′ may not even be defined outside
this inner scope.
Events and Probabilities We define probabilistic events on abstract computations. Events
take values associated with variables val1, ..., valn and return a truth value:
Definition 2 (Event). An event E is a function:
E(valv1 , ..., valvn)→ {true, false}
with v1, ..., vn ∈ V and valv1 ∈ Tv1 , ..., valvn ∈ Tvn .
An Event E can be applied to an abstract computation C thereby specifying a value
between 0 and 1 stating the probability that E does hold after the computation of C.
We denote this: Pr([C]E) ∈ [0, 1].
Example An event that states that a value drawn from a boolean distribution associated
with a variable b is true is formalized as b = true. The probability of this event for a
uniform boolean distribution:
Pr([(b, ${true,false})](b = true)) = 0.5
3 Our Modeling Framework
In this section we describe the framework for specification of systems using abstract
computations from Section 2.
3.1 Monadic Representation of Probabilistic Systems
Complex systems composed of different components can be described with abstract
computations. The components are modeled as functions that take some values bound
to distinct variables and map them to their distributions.
Different components realizing a certain behavior may be modeled independently.
They may be composed so that a system description can be realized. In the industrial
automation domain – which we focus on – typical components for modeling systems
comprise sensors, actuators, and plain computations. Sensors and actuators comprise
a distinct failure behavior which can be modeled by using distributions. Computations
may also be formalized in a way that they are associated with a failure behavior. This
can be used, e.g., to model potential failures in the underlying hardware.
We give a small overview on modeling system behavior using our formalism.
Sequential Composition Given two system components A and B performing a certain
task and formalized using our abstract computation. To activate A and B sequentially
we may combine them using standard monadic composition:
A , B
A gets executed before B and all values computed in A are accessible in B.
Parallel Composition Two components A, B can be combined in parallel composition.
This is denoted: (
A
B
)
A and B should not depend on each other, i.e., no write access to a value which is used
by the other component. Thus, it is possible to linearize parallel composition to:
A , B or B , A
Conditional Structures Conditional structures depending on an expression e can be
realized in a straightforward way:
if e then A1, ..., An else B1, ...Bn
Distributions of variables’ values can be effected in different ways by different branches
of conditional expressions. For this reason, rather complex definitions of distributions
may occur due to conditional structures.
Looping Structures Given a loop body A, looping structures may be formalized in the
following way, resembling process algebras:
L := A , L
Our framework bears some similarity to the way one describes Programmable Logic
Controllers (PLCs) by, e.g., using the IEC-61131–3 standard [20]. It is intended to be
an extension of the property certification proposed in [7] for PLCs.
3.2 An Example
Here we present a generic example that realizes a composed component made from
sensors and a computation.
voter
sensor 1
sensor 2
sensor 3
Value
Fig. 1: Voting Example
The example system in Figure 1 realizes a voting. This is a fault tolerance mecha-
nism that aims at eliminating errors occurring in individual components by replicating
them. In our case a sensor is replicated. One physical value x is read by three different
sensors. Each of these sensors may read a wrong value: some noise is added to x which
corresponds to the distributionNE and is associated with the variable names e1, e2 and
e3. Thus, this noise is independent for each sensor. The voting reads the three sensor
values v1, v2, v3 and can, e.g., be realized by computing the arithmetic mean r.
voter mean(x) ≡ e1,NEe2,NE
e3,NE
 ,
v1,UT (x+ e1)v2,UT (x+ e2)
v3,UT (x+ e3)
 , (r,UTr ( v1+v2+v33 ))
An alternative realization – in the case of discrete noise given by the distribution E
– is given below:
voter 2 (x) ≡ e1, Ee2, E
e3, E
 ,
v1,UT (x+ e1)v2,UT (x+ e2)
v3,UT (x+ e3)
 , (r,UTr

if v1 = v2 then v1
if v1 = v3 then v1
if v2 = v3 then v2
else v3
)
Here we compare the values from the three different sensors. If two are equal we re-
turn one of these equal values. If all three are different, we return the value of the third
sensor.
4 Deductive Rules
We have established rules to reason about system descriptions which are based on ab-
stract computations. Two goals can be distinguished:
– Rules that transform system descriptions into other system descriptions. A special
case of transformation rules perform semantically equivalent transformations.
– Rules that allow reasoning about probabilities of certain events. Some of these rules
allow the transformation of systems with respect to certain events.
Furthermore, we can distinguish rules that work on discrete and those that work on
continuous distributions.
4.1 Soundness and Semantics of Rules
Our abstract computations represent both: system components and a semantical repre-
sentation of them. Further elements that carry semantical meaning are the application
of an event to an abstract computation and the probability function Pr. For this reason,
proving soundness of our rules to reason about abstract computations does not need
to take a transformation between syntax and semantics into account. In order to prove
soundness one proves that certain semantical aspects are preserved during a rule appli-
cation. In particular our rules are proven sound with respect to the following notions of
correctness:
– Rules that transform system descriptions into other system descriptions: These rules
have the following form:
AbstractComputation(val1, ..., valn)
additional assumptions (val1, ..., valn, val′1, ..., val
′
n) .
AbstractComputation′(val′1, ..., val
′
n)
Soundness of such a rule is established by proving the following lemma:
∀ E val1 ... valn val′1 ... val′n .
additional assumptions (val1, ..., valn, val′1, ..., val
′
n) ∧
Pr([AbstractComputation(val1, ..., valn)]E) = 
−→
Pr([AbstractComputation′(val′1, ..., val
′
n)]E) = 
Thus, our notion of correctness states that the probability of all possible events is
preserved while transforming an abstract computation. We use . in this paper to
denote probability preservation for all possible events.
– Rules that allow reasoning about probabilities of certain events directly correspond
to a lemma stating a fact on abstract computations.
Rules are applied by matching the bottom part of the rule to a system description and
event. The application reduces the expression to the upper part of the rule.
4.2 Basic Rules
Here we present basic rules to handle system descriptions within our framework. Their
soundness is proved in our scheme by using the properties of abstract computations.
Function Propagation Rule We have established rules to reason and simplify our monadic
system descriptions. Simple rules comprise, e.g., function propagation.
∀i ≤ m,x′i 6= x′ (x′′,UT (g(f(x1, ..., xn), x′1, ...x′m))) .
(x′′, ..., (x′,UT (f(x1, ..., xn))) , (x′′,UT (g(x′, x′1, ..., x′m))))
A generalized version of this rule does not require the usage of nested abstract compu-
tations. It is sufficient that x′ is not used again in later expressions.
Omitting Unused Parts Rule Unused parts of an expression may be omitted.
∀i ≤ n, x′i 6= x
(x,X ′(x′1, ..., x
′
n)) .
(x,X(x1, ..., xn)) , (x,X
′(x′1, ..., x
′
n))
This rule performs a kind of dead-code elimination
Congruence Exchange Rule Semantical equivalent parts may be replaced by each other.
A,B,C B . B′ .
A,B′, C
Permutation Rule Parts may be permuted if they do not depend on each other.
∀i ≤ n, xi 6= x′
∀i′ ≤ m,x′i 6= x
(x,X(x1, ..., xn)) , (x
′, X ′(x′1, ..., x
′
m)) .
(x′, X ′(x′1, ..., x
′
m)) , (x,X(x1, ..., xn))
4.3 General Rules Relating Events and Probabilities
The following rules bridge the gaps between abstract computations, events and proba-
bilities. Soundness is established by using the definitions from Section 2.
Event Approximation for Continuous Distributions Rule The following rule allows the
numerical approximation of a probability. Given the continuous distributionD, its prob-
ability density function fD and an order on the elements with this distribution ≤. We
can use an approximation of fD : fA in order to guarantee a certain maximal probabil-
ity of an event that checks whether a certain value drawn from D is below some upper
bound a. PD and PA denote the cumulative probability functions (or approximation in
case of PA) that correspond to fD and fA.
∀ v .fD(v) ≤ fA(v) PA(a) < 
Pr([(x,D)](x ≤ a)) < 
We can use this rule to simplify expressions and leave the subgoal PA(a) <  for
numerical approximation. Similarly the following rule holds:
∀ v .fA(v) ≤ fD(v) 1− PA(a) < 
Pr([(x,D)](x ≥ a)) < 
Note that for the first rule the approximation
∫∞
−∞ fA(v) dv will be greater or equal
than 1 while in the second rule it while be smaller or equal than one. This is ensured by
the first condition in both rules.
Range Event Splitting Rule The following rule may be used to split an event stating
that a variable is outside a certain range into two independent subevents.
Pr([(x,D)](x ≥ a)) < 1 Pr([(x,D)](x ≤ b)) < 2
Pr([(x,D)](x ≥ a ∨ x ≤ b)) < 1 + 2
4.4 Rules for Normal Distributions
Here we present a few rules valid for normal distributions. Their soundness can be
easily proven since they correspond to well known facts about normal distributions.
Normal Distribution Rule We have established a rule for combining values originating
from different normal distributions N (µi, σ2i ) .
(x′,N (µ1 + ...+ µn, σ21 + ...+ σ2n)) .
(x′,
x1,N (µ1, σ21)...
xn,N (µn, σ2n)
 , (x′,UT (x1 + ...+ xn)))
Normal Distribution Probability Event Rule Another rule relates normal distributions,
events, and probabilities.
Pr([(x,N (µ, σ2))](x ≤ µ− a)) <  a ≤ σ σ ≤ σ′
Pr([(x,N (µ, σ′2))](x ≤ µ− a)) < 
It corresponds to standard facts on normal distributions. Likewise the following rule
holds.
Pr([(x,N (µ, σ2))](x ≥ µ+ a)) <  a ≤ σ σ ≤ σ′
Pr([(x,N (µ, σ′2))](x ≤ µ+ a)) < 
These rules relate abstract computations with typical events that check whether a
normally distributed variable has a value in a certain range. Their correctness is estab-
lished by looking at the probability density function for the normal distribution,
PN (x) = 1σ√2pi exp
(
− 12
(
x−µ
σ
)2)
its derivation and especially the points µ− σ and µ+ σ.
Voting Abstraction Rule A specialized rule for simplifying the semantics of voting can
be established. Setups containing a voting computing the mean of several values which
may be influenced byN distributed errors can be simplified by using the following rule:
(r, ((e,N (µ1+...+µnn , σ
2
1+...+σ
2
n
n2 )) , (r,UTr (x+ e)))) .
(r,
 e1,N (µ1, σ21)...
en,N (µn, σ2n)
 ,
 v1,UT (x+ e1)...
vn,UT (x+ en)
 , (r,UTr ( v1+...+vnn ) ))
The soundness of this rule is derived from the Normal Distribution Rule and the
Function Propagation Rule.
4.5 Rules for Discrete Distributions
Some facts can only be derived for discrete distributions.
Discrete Probability Computation Rule The following rule may be used to compute
probabilities of expressions containing discrete distributions:∑
x′∈DD(x
′) · Pr([(x, F (x))]E)
Pr([(x′, D), (x, F (x′)]E)
A distribution is eliminated by considering the probabilities of all possible values inde-
pendently.
Event Probability Weakening Computation Rule This rule relates events and probabili-
ties of discrete distributions.
Pr([(x,D′)](x = y)) <  D(y) ≤ D′(y)
Pr([(x,D)](x = y)) < 
It is to be used with distinct events that check for the appearance of certain values. It
can also be used to approximate distributions similar to the Event Approximation for
Continuous Distributions Rule.
Additional Rules and Approximations Our presented rules may be used to perform
simplifications in order to discover a certain correctness result. Additionally, after these
simplifications we may use numerical methods, e.g., to approximate probabilities of
expressions that are not easily handled in an algebraic way.
5 Continuous Case Study
In this case study we regard a work piece on a conveyor belt. Actuators and sensors are
used to bring it close to a desired position. A version of the voting element (cf. Sec-
mean
sensor 1
sensor 2
voterValue
Fig. 2: Voting element
tion 3.2) with two sensors depicted in Figure 2 is used in our case study:
vote2(x) ≡(
e1,N (µE , σ2E(x))
e2,N (µE , σ2E(x))
)
,
(
v1,UTv1 (x+ e1)
v2,UTv2 (x+ e2)
)
, (r,UTr
(
v1+v2
2 )
)
The variance is parameterized with the current position x since the sensors accuracy
depends on the current position of the work piece. Since both sensors behave in the
same way, our rules to simplify normal distributions are still applicable.
position on conveyor belt
sensor 1
sensor 2
mean actuator
sensor 1
sensor 2
mean actuator
time
x
Fig. 3: Conveyor belt control
In the actual case study a work piece is put on a conveyor belt. Our goal is to bring
this work piece close to a position p. We can measure the position x on the conveyor
belt by using two sensors. The sensors can be influenced by normal distributed errors.
We can activate the conveyor belt to adjust the position. This repositioning will also be
influenced by some possible error.
Our conveyor belt case study is shown in Figure 3. In our formalism it is described
as shown in Figure 4. The following sequence is performed two times in order to achieve
a good positioning of the work piece:
– We read the value of the work piece via two different sensors. The value of the
position of the work piece x may be effected by N (µE , σE(x)) distributed sensor
errors e1, e2 while reading them with the sensors. The sensors write the values
which they have read to variables v1, v2. We perform a mean voting on their results
and store it in a variable r.
– We activate the conveyor belt in order to move the work piece close to p by giving
it p− r as repositioning information.
– The conveyor belt is not necessarily moved exactly by the requested distance, but
again, the actuator introduces an error which is N (σ′E , σ′E) distributed.
conv belt(x, p) ≡
(r,
(
e1,N (µE , σ2E(x))
e2,N (µE , σ2E(x))
)
,
(
v1,UTv1 (x+ e1)
v2,UTv2 (x+ e2)
)
, (r,UTr
(
v1+v2
2
)
)
) ,
(p′,UT (p− r)) , (e,N (µ′E , σ′2E )), (x,UT (p′ · (1 + e))) ,
(r,
(
e1,N (µE , σ2E(x))
e2,N (µE , σ2E(x))
)
,
(
v1,UTv1 (x+ e1)
v2,UTv2 (x+ e2)
)
, (r,UTr
(
v1+v2
2
)
)
) ,
(p′,UT (p− r)) , (e,N (µ′E , σ′2E )), (x,UT (p′ · (1 + e)))
Fig. 4: Conveyor belt control (formal description)
Our goal is to ensure that the conveyor belt will be in a close range to a distinct
position p with a certain probability. We are interested in questions like: what is the
probability that the difference between optimal and actual position is smaller than a
given constant l: p− x < l:
Pr([conv belt(x, p)](l ≤ p− x)) < 
The maximal probability that this is not the case shall be .
In order to do so, we apply our rules defined in Section 4 to the system definition.
The goal is to derive the distribution of p once the system has reached its terminal state.
In a first step, we simplify the voting of the sensors (Congruence Exchange, Voting
Abstraction, Permutation, associativity of monads). Thus, we derive the following sim-
plified system description:
(r,N (x+µE , σ
2
E(x)
2 )) , (p
′,UT (p− r)) , (e,N (µ′E , σ′2E )) , (x,UT (p′ · (1+ e))) ,
(r,N (x+ µE , σ
2
E(x)
2 )) , (p
′,UT (p− r)) , (e,N (µ′E , σ′2E )) , (x,UT (p′ · (1 + e)))
This can be further simplified (Congruence Exchange, Function Propagation):
(r,N (x+ µE , σ
2
E(x)
2 )) , (e,N (µ′E , σ′2E )) , (x,UT ((p− r) · (1 + e))) ,
(r,N (x+ µE , σ
2
E(x)
2 )) , (e,N (µ′E , σ′2E )) , (x,UT ((p− r) · (1 + e)))
We do not touch the expression containing the product of normal distributed vari-
ables.
Since the initial position x and p are known, at this stage one can numerically han-
dle the expression in order to convince oneself that numerical constraints on these dis-
tributions are met. Computer algebra systems allow for an over-approximation of the
distribution above. Thus, one can apply the Event Approximation for Continuous Dis-
tributions Rule and ensure that the given failure probability  is met.
Furthermore, given the expression above one can consider possible optimization
alternatives, like, e.g., updating the sensors or actuators so that they feature a better
error distribution. Another optimization possibility would be to replicate the sensor-
actuator part another time. One can numerically recalculate the the results and convince
oneself that they meet a certain .
6 A Discrete Case Study
Figure 5 shows a second case study. Again it is taken from the area of industrial au-
tomation. A sensor decides whether a work piece is red or blue. Depending on the sen-
sor choice the work piece is sorted to one of the two stacks: stack1 for red workpieces,
stack2 for blue workpieces. Its formal description is given in Figure 6. The sensor can
perform sorting
actuator
workpiece
sensor 1
detect color:
red / blue
stack 1
stack 2
Fig. 5: Discrete sensor and actuator
return an erroneous result: It can return blue for a red working piece and vice versa.
Likewise the actuator may sort a workpiece to a wrong stack. The probabilities of such
a malfunctioning of sensor and actor are formalized using the distributionsDred,Dblue,
Dstack1, and Dstack2.
Consider the following example distribution density functions:
fred = λx.
(
if x = red then 0.95
if x = blue then 0.05
)
DiscreteSort(valc) ≡
(c,UTc(valc)) ,
(c′,
(
if c = red then Dred
if c = blue then Dblue
)
) ,
(s,
(
if c′ = red then Dstack1
if c′ = blue then Dstack2
)
)
Fig. 6: Discrete sensor and actuator(formal description)
fblue = λx.
(
if x = red then 0.05
if x = blue then 0.95
)
fstack1 = λx.
(
if x = stack1 then 0.95
if x = stack2 then 0.05
)
fstack2 = λx.
(
if x = stack1 then 0.01
if x = stack2 then 0.99
)
With these definitions we can compute the probability that a red workpiece will be
put on the wrong stack by using the Discrete Probability Computation Rule. We do this
by stating the following expression using an appropriate event:
Pr([DiscreteSort(red)](s = stack2))
The expression can be simplified by using the Discrete Probability Computation Rule.
Finally we get the following probability:
1− (0.95 · 0.95 + 0.05 · 0.01) = 0.0970
Accordingly we can state an event stating that a blue workpiece will be put on the wrong
stack:
Pr([DiscreteSort(blue)](s = stack1))
Simplification gives us the following probability:
1− (0.95 · 0.99 + 0.05 · 0.05) = 0.057
7 Conclusion
We propose a framework to specify systems and their behavior and possible divergences
that might occur in these systems. We present some extensions and more details com-
pared to a previous version of this paper [4]. Our framework is build upon a monadic
representation of execution steps which allows the representation of possible errors and
their probabilities. A rule based logic is presented to reason about our system descrip-
tion and perform algebraic simplifications. Ultimately we derive guarantees for the sys-
tem description. Our rules encapsulate common tasks, reasoning is not limited to these
rules. In particular we allow numerical approximations. We present two case studies to
demonstrate possible usage scenarios of our framework.
Future Work As a long term goal, our framework is intended to be used with the Coq [9]
theorem prover. Depending on the usage scenario, an implementation in another veri-
fication / analysis tool might also be an option. We continue looking at additional case
studies.
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